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Abstract
A set of divisible resources becomes available over a sequence of rounds and needs to be allocated im-
mediately and irrevocably. Our goal is to distribute these resources to maximize fairness and efficiency.
Achieving any non-trivial guarantees in an adversarial setting is impossible. However, we show that
normalizing the agent values, a very common assumption in fair division, allows us to escape this impos-
sibility. Our main result is an online algorithm for the case of two agents that ensures the outcome is
envy-free while guaranteeing 91.6% of the optimal social welfare. We also show that this is near-optimal:
there is no envy-free algorithm that guarantees more than 93.3% of the optimal social welfare.
1 Introduction
We consider a basic problem in online fair division: a set of divisible items become available over a sequence
of T rounds (one item per round), and in each round we need to make an irrevocable decision regarding how
to distribute the corresponding item among a set N of n agents. The value vit of each agent i for the item
in round t is revealed at the beginning of that round and our goal is to ensure that the overall allocation at
the end of the T rounds is fair and efficient, despite the information limitations that we face.
Prior work on online resource allocation problems such as the one above has mostly focused on maximizing
efficiency. In our setting, this could easily be achieved by fully allocating the item of each round t to the
agent i with the largest vit value. However, this approach can often lead to outcomes that are patently unfair,
which is unacceptable in many important real-world applications. For example, ensuring that the outcome is
fair is crucial for food banks that allocate food each day to soup kitchens and other local charities depending
on the demand Prendergast [2017], or software engineering companies that distribute shared computational
resources among their employees Gorokh et al. [2020].
Achieving fairness in such an online setting can be significantly more complicated than just maximizing
efficiency. This is mostly due to the fact that reaching a fair outcome may require a more holistic view of the
instance at hand. For example, the fair-share property (also referred to as proportionality in some contexts),
one of the classic notions of fairness, requires that each of the n agents should eventually receive at least
a 1/n fraction of their total value for all the T items. But, agents who only value highly demanded items
are harder to satisfy than agents who value items of low demand, and online algorithms may be unable to
distinguish between these two types of agents soon enough. As a result, designing efficient online algorithms
that also satisfy the fair-share property is an important, yet non-trivial, task.
In fact, it is easy to show that without imposing any normalization on the agent values, essentially the
only algorithm that guarantees the fair-share property is the naive one that equally splits every item among
all agents (see Appendix A for a proof). This yields an outcome that is inefficient, unless all agents happen
to have the same values. But, the standard approach in fair division is to normalize the agents’ values so that
they add up to the same constant (that constant is usually 1). As we show in this paper, this normalization
is sufficient for us to escape the strong impossibility result and achieve non-trivial efficiency guarantees while
satisfying the fair-share property.
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1.1 Our results and techniques
With the exception of a few results in Section 6, all of our results focus on instances involving two agents,
which already pose several non-trivial obstacles.
We first consider the performance of non-adaptive online algorithms, i.e., algorithms whose allocation
decision in each round t depends only on the agents’ values for item t. A major benefit of these algorithms is
that they need not keep track of any additional information, making them easy to implement. We focus on
the interesting family of poly-proportional algorithms that are parameterized by a value p ≥ 0, and in each
round t allocate to each agent i a fraction of the item equal to
vpit∑
j∈N v
p
jt
. For p = 0, we recover the algorithm
that splits each item equally among the agents (which satisfies fair-share but can be inefficient), while for
p = ∞ we get the algorithm that allocates each item to the agent with the highest value (which is efficient
but violates fair-share). Another well-studied algorithm from this family, that is used widely in practice, is
the proportional allocation (or just proportional) algorithm, which corresponds to the case p = 1. We show
that this algorithm satisfies fair-share and is a significant improvement in terms of efficiency: it guarantees
82.8% of the optimal social welfare (Theorem 1).
As the value of the parameter p grows, the corresponding poly-proportional algorithm allocates each item
more “agressively”, i.e., a larger fraction goes to the agents with the highest values. As a result, higher values
of p lead to increased efficiency, but may also lead to the violation of the fair-share property. We precisely
quantify this intuition by first showing that for all p > 2 the corresponding poly-proportional algorithm
does not satisfy fair-share (Lemma 1). Then, we show that the poly-proportional algorithm with parameter
p = 2, the quadratic-proportional algorithm, satisfies fair-share and guarantees 89.4% of the optimal social
welfare (Theorem 2). As a result, we conclude that 89.4% is the optimal approximation achievable by a
poly-proportional algorithm that satisfies fair-share.
Moving beyond non-adaptive algorithms, we proceed to study the extent to which adaptivity could
lead to even better approximation guarantees. With that goal in mind, we propose the family of guarded
poly-proportional algorithms, which are a slight modification of the poly-proportional algorithm, also pa-
rameterized by p. We show that every algorithm in this family satisfies fair-share, and our main result is
that the guarded poly-proportional algorithm with p = 2.7 guarantees 91.6% of the optimal social welfare
(Theorem 3). On the other hand, we prove that no fair-share algorithm (adaptive or non-adaptive) can
achieve an approximation to the optimal welfare better than 93.3% (Theorem 4), thus establishing that our
positive result is near optimal.
To prove our results, we leverage the fact that our algorithms have a closed form expression for the
agents’ allocations and utilities. We can use this fact and write a mathematical program that computes the
worst-case approximation to the optimal welfare over all instances. We use variables vt for the value of agent
1 for item t and λt for the ratio between agents’ values. Even though this program is not itself convex (so at
first glance it’s unclear how useful it is), we show that under a suitable choice of variables and constraints,
fixing some of the variables (i.e. treating them as constants) gives a linear program with respect to the
remaining variables. The majority of the constraints in this LP are non-negativity constraints, so, using the
fundamental theorem of linear programming we conclude that the worst-case instance only has a few (two
or three depending on the algorithm) items with positive valuations. Once we have such small instances we
can analyze the approximation using simple calculus. See the proofs of Theorem 1, 2 and 3 for details.
We conclude with a brief discussion regarding instances with n ≥ 3 agents. We already know from the
work of Caragiannis et al. [2012] on the price of fairness that even offline algorithms cannot achieve an
approximation better than Ω(1/
√
n); we complement this result by showing that the non-adaptive propor-
tional algorithm matches this bound. Finally, we provide an interesting local characterization of all online
algorithms that satisfy the fair-share property.
2 Related Work
The same model that we consider in this setting, i.e., online allocation of divisible items with normalized
agent valuations, was very recently studied by Gorokh et al. [2020]. But, rather than introducing fairness
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as a hard constraint, like we do here, they (approximately) maximize the Nash social welfare objective. On
the other hand, Bogomolnaia et al. [2019] maximize efficiency subject to fair-share constraints, like we do,
but not in an adversarial setting. The agent values are stochastically generated and fairness is guaranteed
only in expectation.
An additional motivation behind our assumption that the agents’ values are normalized comes from
systems where the users are asked to express their value using a budget of some artificial currency in the
form of tokens. If a user has a high value for a good then she can use more tokens to convey this information
to the algorithm. Since all users have the same budget, their values are normalized by design. A natural,
and very well-studied algorithm in these systems is the proportional algorithm, which distributes each item in
proportion to the expressed value (see, e.g., Zhang [2005], Feldman et al. [2009], Christodoulou et al. [2016],
Braˆnzei et al. [2017]). We provide an analysis of this algorithm, but we also achieve improved results using
alternative algorithms.
Zeng and Psomas [2020] considered the trade-off between fairness and efficiency under a variety of ad-
versaries, but in a setting with indivisible items and non-normalized valuations. Against the strong adver-
sary studied here, their results are negative: no algorithm with non-trivial fairness guarantees can Pareto-
dominate a uniformly random allocation.
More broadly, our paper is part of the growing literature on online, or dynamic, fair division. Much
of this prior work analyzes settings where the agents are static and the resources arrive over time, like we
do Walsh [2011], Benade et al. [2018], He et al. [2019]. Another line of work studies the allocation of static
resources among dynamically arriving and departing agents Kash et al. [2014], Friedman et al. [2015, 2017],
Im et al. [2020].
3 Preliminaries
We consider the problem of allocating T divisible items among a set N of n agents. A fractional allocation
x defines for each agent i ∈ N and item t the fraction xit of that item that the agent will receive. A feasible
allocation satisfies
∑
i∈N xit ≤ 1 for all items t.
We assume the valuations of the agents are additive: each agent i has valuation vit for item t, and utility
ui(x) =
∑
t∈[T ] vitxit for an allocation x. We also assume that the agents’ valuations are normalized so that∑
t∈[T ] vit = 1. We evaluate the efficiency of an allocation x using the social welfare (SW), i.e., the sum of
all agents’ utilities SW (x) =
∑
i∈N ui(x).
An allocation x satisfies fair-share if ui(x) ≥ 1n for every agent i ∈ N . We say that an algorithm satisfies
fair-share if it always outputs an allocation that satisfies fair-share. Another popular definition of fairness
is envy-freeness, which dictates that no agent i values the allocation of some other agent j more than her
own. It is well known that if every item t is fully allocated, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xit = 1, then envy-freeness implies
fair-share, and for two-agent instances (which is the main focus of this paper) the two notions coincide.
The item valuations are not available to us up-front; instead, the items arrive online (one per round) and
the agent values for the item of round t are revealed when the item arrives. The algorithm then makes an
irrevocable decision about how to allocate the item before moving on to the next round. We evaluate our
algorithms using worst-case analysis, so one can think of the values being chosen by an adaptive adversary
aiming to hurt the algorithm’s performance. Throughout the paper our algorithms do not need to know the
total number of rounds T , but all our negative results apply even to algorithms that have this information.
We say an algorithm is non-adaptive if its allocation decision for round t solely depends on the valuations
at round t, whereas an adaptive algorithm can use the valuations and allocations of all the previous rounds.
An interesting family of non-adaptive algorithms parametrized by a value p are ones that we call poly-
proportional algorithms whose allocation in each round t is proportional to vpit, i.e., each agent i is allocated
a fraction xit = v
p
it/
∑
j∈N v
p
jt. For p = 0 this become the equal-split algorithm, for p = 1 the proportional
algorithm, and for p =∞ the greedy one.
Given some algorithm A, let xA(v) denote the overall allocation that it outputs on an instance with
agent values v, and let xOPT(v) be the social welfare maximizing allocation. A is an α-approximation to
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the optimal social welfare if
min
v
SW (xA(v))
SW (xOPT(v))
≥ α.
Note that our algorithms are constrained to be online and to always output fair-share outcomes, while the
welfare maximizing benchmark is restricted by neither one of the two.
4 Non-Adaptive Algorithms
Non-adaptive algorithms have the important benefit that they need not keep track of historical information
regarding the agents’ allocation or preferences. A naive example of such an algorithm is equal-split, i.e,. the
poly-proportional algorithm with p = 0. Since this algorithm splits every item equally among the two agents,
they both always receive value exactly 1/2, and hence the outcome is fair-share. However, this outcome can
be very inefficient, leading to a 50% approximation to the optimal welfare (e.g., consider an instance with
v11 = v22 = 1 and v12 = v21 = 0).
Our first result analyzes the widely-used proportional algorithm (p = 1) and shows that it guarantees
82.8% of the social welfare. This is already a big improvement compared to 50%, but we then also provide
a fair-share algorithm that improves this further, to 89.4%. Proofs missing from this section can be found
in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. The proportional algorithm satisfies fair-share and gives a 0.828 approximation to the optimal
welfare.
Proof. First we porve the envy-freeness of the proportional algorithm. We will use Milne’s inequality Milne
[1925] which states that for all xj , yj > 0:
m∑
j=1
xjyj
xj + yj
≤ (
∑m
j=1 xj)(
∑m
j=1 yj)∑m
j=1 xj +
∑m
j=1 yj
.
Plugging in xj = v1j and yj = v2j , the LHS is exactly the value of agent 1 for agent 2’s allocation, while
the RHS is equal to 1/2.
We now proof the efficiency guarantees of the proportional algorithm. Given an instance v, let vt = v1t
and λt =
v2t
v1t
for each t ∈ [T ]. Let ALG be the welfare of the proportional algorithm.
ALG =
∑
t∈[T ]
v2t + (vtλt)
2
vt + vtλt
=
∑
t∈[T ]
vt
1 + λ2t
1 + λt
.
Now, consider the following mathematical program:
minimize
∑
t∈[T ] vt
1+λ2t
1+λt
subject to
∑
t∈[T ] vt =
∑
t∈[T ] vtλt (1)∑
t∈[T ]:λt≤1 vt +
∑
t∈[T ]:λt>1 λtvt = 1 (2)
vt, λt ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [T ]
The objective is to minimize the approximation to welfare we receive from the algorithm. In this program,
we don’t enforce that the agents’ values add up to 1, but we simply have them be equal to each other
(constraint 1). Instead, we ask that the optimal welfare is equal to 1 (constraint 2).
First, we argue that solving this program would give us the worst case approximation to welfare. Consider
an arbitrary feasible solution v, λ to this program; by dividing each agents’ values (each vit) by their common
total value
∑
t∈[T ] vit we get a feasible instance for the original problem. Furthermore, the approximation
to welfare in this instance is equal to the value of the objective: the social welfare of the proportional
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algorithm and the optimal social welfare are the program’s objective and 1, divided by the normalization
term
∑
t∈[T ] vit, respectively. Showing that an arbitrary online instance gives a feasible solution to this
program with the approximation to welfare unchanged is equally straightforward.
Second, notice that for any fixed λ, the remaining program, with variables only the vts, is a linear program
with T variables. By the fundamental theorem of linear programming, a minimizer occurs at the region’s
corner, i.e. there is a minimizer with T constraints tight. Since the total number of constraints is T + 2, and
the first two constraints are tight, T − 2 of the T tight constraints are non-negativity constraints. So the
worst case approximation occurs when there are exactly two variables/rounds with positive value for agent
1. Without loss of generality (the proportional algorithm is memoryless) these are the first two items.
Third, for every instance where agent 1 values only the first two items, the approximation to optimal
welfare is minimized when agent 2 also values only the first two items.
Now, consider the two rounds instance, in the original notation, where agent 1 has value v1 for item 1
and 1− v1 for item 2, while agent 2 has values 1− v2 and v2. Without loss of generality v1 ≥ 1− v2, which
implies v2 ≥ 1− v1. Therefore, OPT = SW (xOPT(v)) = v1 + v2, and
ALG =
v21 + (1− v2)2
v1 + 1− v2 +
(1− v1)2 + v22
v2 + 1− v1 .
Then, overloading notation, we have that the approximation to the welfare is
α(v1, v2) =
v21+(1−v2)2
v1+1−v2 +
(1−v1)2+v22
v2+1−v1
v1 + v2
.
We analyze this function, by taking partial derivatives and analyzing all critical points. We find that the
worst approximation to optimal welfare is achieved for v1 = v2 = 1/
√
2, and has value α
(
1√
2
, 1√
2
)
=
2(
√
2− 1) ≈ 0.828. See Appendix B for the missing details.
4.1 Performance of poly-proportional algorithms
We now study the family of poly-proportional algorithms more broadly. As we mentioned in the introduction,
poly-proportional algorithms with higher values of p may lead to increased social welfare, but they also make
it increasingly likely that the fair-share property will be violated. We first show that we cannot increase p
by too much before losing fair-share: for any p > 2 the corresponding poly-proportional algorithm does not
satisfy fair-share.
Lemma 1. The poly-proportional algorithm with parameter p does not satisfy fair-share for any p > 2.
Proof. Consider the following two item instance. The first round has values x and 1 for agents 1 and 2,
respectively, while the second round has values 1 − x and 0. Agent 1 has utility x·xp1+xp + 1 − x = 1 − xxp+1 .
For x = ( 1p−1 )
1/p, agent 1 gets utility 1− p−1p ( 1p−1 )1/p. For all a > 0, b ∈ (0, 1), we have that ab > aa+b , thus
the utility of agent 1 is 1 − p−1p
(
1
p−1
) 1
p
< 1 − p−1p
1
p−1
1
p−1+
1
p
= 1 − p−12p−1 . This expression is less than 1/2 for
all p > 2.
Our main result in this section is for the poly-proportional algorithm with parameter p = 2: we call
this the quadratic-proportional algorithm. We show that this algorithm satisfies fair-share and achieves a
0.894 approximation to the optimal welfare, a significant improvement over the proportional algorithm. By
Lemma 1, the quadratic-proportional algorithm guarantees the optimal social welfare within the class of
fair-share poly-proportional algorithms.
Theorem 2. The quadratic-proportional algorithm satisfies fair-share and achieves a 0.894 approximation
to the optimal social welfare.
Theorem 2 follows from Lemmas 2 and 3.
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Lemma 2. The quadratic-proportional algorithm satisfies fair-share.
Proof. It suffices to show that agent 1 gets utility at least 1/2 in all instances: if this holds, then the
same holds for agent 2, by symmetry. Given any instance, we first show that merging and splitting certain
items(rounds) results in a new instance where agent 1 is worse off.
Merging a set S of items with values (v1t, v2t) creates a new item with value (
∑
t∈S v1t,
∑
t∈S v2t). A split
operation on an item with values (v1, v2), v1 ≥ v2, creates two items, with values (v2, v2) and (v1 − v2, 0).
Claim 1. Let v be any instance, and let v′ be the instance where we split all items t ∈ [T ] such that v1tv2t > 1,
with v2t > 0. Then the utility of agent 1, in the quadratic-proportional algorithm, in instance v
′ is at most
her utility in instance v.
Proof. It suffices to show that the utility of agent 1 weakly decreases after splitting a single item with values
v1 = x, v2 = y, such that
x
y ≥ 1. Let u be the utility of agent 1 (for this item) before splitting and u∗ the
utility after splitting. We have that u = x
p+1
xp+yp and u
∗ = y
p+1
2yp + x− y = x− y2 .
u− u∗ = y
p+1 − 2xyp + yxp
2xp + 2yp
.
It suffices to show that this is non-negative for all x ≥ y. Since 2xp + 2yp ≥ 0, we only need to show
that yp+1 − 2xyp + yxp ≥ 0. Dividing both sides by yp+1, we have 1 − 2xy + (xy )p ≥ 0. For p = 2, the LHS
is equal to (x/y − 1)2 which is non-negative. Note that we used the fact that x > y to ensure that splitting
was a valid operation.
Claim 2. Let v be any instance, and let v′ be the instance where we take two arbitrary items of v that satisfy
v1t
v2t
≤ 1 and merge them. Then the utility of agent 1, in the quadratic-proportional algorithm, in instance v′
is at most her utility in instance v.
Proof. Let a and b be the two items we want to merge, with corresponding values v1a, v2a, v1b and v2b. We
show that
v31a
v21a + v
2
2a
+
v31b
v21b + v
2
2b
≥ (v1a + v1b)
3
(v1a + v1b)2 + (v2a + v2b)2
.
We can simplify this expression to:
(v2bv1a − v2av1b)2
(
v22bv1a + 2v2bv2a(v1a + v1b)
+v1b(v
2
2a − v1a(v1a + v1b))
) ≥ 0.
If v2bv1a − v2av1b = 0 we are done. Assume that this is not the case. It suffices to show that
v22bv1a + 2v2bv2a(v1a + v1b) + v1b(v
2
2a − v21a − v1av1b) ≥ 0.
First, we are going to drop the second term of the sum. Second, since v1av2a ≤ 1, we have that v22a ≥ v21a,
and the third term is lower bounded by v1av
2
1b. It thus remains to show that v
2
2bv1a − v1av21b ≥ 0, which
holds since v1bv2b ≤ 1.
We repeatedly apply Claims 1 and 2, until no splitting or merging is possible, to get a worst case instance
for agent 1. This instance will have multiple items with zero value for agent 2 that we can simply combine
into a single item. Since splitting is no longer possible, there are no items t ∈ [T ] with v2t > 0 and v1tv2t > 1.
Since merging is not possible there is at most one item t with v1tv2t ≤ 1. Therefore, we have an instance with
two items, one with both positive values (that we cannot merge) and one with zero value for agent 2. Let v
be the value of agent 1 for item 1, and 1− v her value for item 2. Agent 2’s values are 1 and 0.
Agent 1 has utility v
3
v2+1 + 1 − v = 1 − vv2+1 . It is easy to confirm that this function is minimized for
v = 1 where it takes the value 1/2.
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Lemma 3. The quadratic-proportional algorithm achieves a 0.894 approximation to the optimal social wel-
fare.
We start by showing that two item instances are the worst case. This is, in fact, true for all algorithms
in the poly-proportional family.
Claim 3. For any p, the worst-case instance (in terms of approximation) for the poly-proportional algorithm
with parameter p has at most two items.
Proof. Similarly to Theorem 1 one can write a mathematical program with variables vt and λt that computes
the worst case approximation to welfare, and then observe that for every fixed choice of λ the remaining
program is in fact linear. Applying the fundamental theorem of linear programming we conclude that at
most two vt variables are non-zero. We defer the details to Appendix B.
Proof of Lemma 3. Given Claim 3 we only need to consider two item instances. Let v1 and 1 − v2 be the
agents’ values for item 1, and 1− v1 and v2 their values for item 2.
Without loss of generality, assume that v1 > 1 − v2 (and therefore v2 > 1 − v1). The optimal welfare
becomes OPT = v1 + v2. Consider the performance of our algorithm:
ALG =
v31+(1−v2)3
v21+(1−v2)2 +
(1−v1)3+v32
(1−v1)2+v22 .
The approximation to welfare is
α(v1, v2) =
ALG
OPT
=
(1−v1)3+v32
(1−v1)2+v22 +
(1−v2)3+v31
(1−v2)2+v21
v1 + v2
In the remainder of the proof we take partial derivatives with respect to v1 and v2 and analyze the critical
points, using numerical solvers for part of the proof. The worst extreme point is (0.6265, 0.6265), which gives
α(0.6265, 0.6265) > 0.894. See Appendix B for details.
5 Adaptive Algorithms
Moving beyond non-adaptive algorithms, in this section we consider the benefits of being adaptive. In
deciding how to allocate the item of each round t, adaptive algorithms can take into consideration, e.g., the
utility of each agent so far, or what portion of their total value is yet to be realized. But, what would be a
useful way to leverage this information in order to achieve improved approximation guarantees?
We propose a natural way to modify the family of poly-proportional mechanisms studied in the previous
section. Specifically, we use the additional information to “guard” against the violation of the fair-share
property. To motivate this modification, assume that at the end of some round c during the execution of
a poly-proportional with p > 2 the utility that one of the agents has received so far plus her value for all
remaining items is exactly 1/2, i.e.,
c∑
t=1
vitxit +
T∑
t=c+1
vit =
1
2
.
This would mean that, unless that agent receives all of the remaining items that she has positive value for
in full, then she would not receive her fair share. We refer to this as a critical point and use it to define
the family of guarded poly-proportional algorithms parametrized by p: while no agent has reached a critical
point, the algorithm is identical to the corresponding non-adaptive poly-proportional one; but, if some agent
reaches a critical point, then all the remaining items are fully allocated to that agent. It therefore leverages
adaptivity in a simple way, by checking for critical points.
Note that a critical point may not necessarily arise only at the beginning or the end of a round. However,
it is easy to show that we can assume this is the case without loss of generality. Roughly speaking, if a critical
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point is reached during the execution of some round t while a fraction f of that item has been allocated,
then we can divide that item into two pieces (of size f and 1 − f), creating an instance with T + 1 items
where the critical point is reached at the end of round t, and without affecting the outcome of the algorithm.
We discuss this in more detail in Appendix C.
If some agent reaches a critical point then, clearly, these algorithms ensure that the agent will receive
her fair share. But, this does not imply that the other agent will also receive her fair share. For this to be
true, the other should have received her fair share before that critical point, because she will receive no more
items.
Our next result shows that, in fact, this family of algorithms always satisfies fair-share.
Lemma 4. The guarded poly-proportional algorithm with parameter p satisfies fair-share for all p ≥ 0.
Proof. If there is no critical point the statement trivially holds, so assume, without loss of generality, that
agent 1 reaches a critical point at round c. By definition, we have that
∑c
t=1 v1t · x1t +
∑T
t=c+1 vit = 1/2.
By the normalization assumption,
∑c
t=1 v1t · (x1t +x2t) +
∑T
t=c+1 vit = 1. We get
∑c
t=1 v1t ·x2t =
∑c
t=1 v1t ·
vp2t
vp1t+v
p
2t
= 12 . That is, it remains to show that fair-share is satisfied for agent 2.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 we will write a mathematical program with variables
vt = v1t and λt =
v2t
v1t
, for all t ∈ [t]. The goal of the program this time will be to find a worst-case instance
with respect to agent 2, given that c is a critical point for agent 1.
Agent 1’s utility of resources allocated to agent 2 can be expressed as
∑
t≤c vt
λpt
1+λpt
, while agent 2 has
utility
∑
t≤c vt
λp+1t
1+λpt
. Consider the program
minimize
∑
t≤c vt
λp+1t
1+λpt
subject to
∑c
t=1 vt
λpt
1+λpt
= 12∑c
t=1 vt ≤ 1∑c
t=1 vtλt ≤ 1
vt, λt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [c]
Notice that given a feasible solution to this program one can always construct a valid online allocation
instance, where the guarded poly-proportional algorithm with parameter p will reach critical point c for
agent 1 and agent 2’s utility is exactly the objective function, and vice versa. Proving the lemma is therefore
equivalent to showing that the optimal solution u2 of this program above is at least
1
2 .
Consider any fixed choice for the λt variables: the remaining program is linear, and therefore, by the
fundamental theorem of linear programming we know that there exists an optimal solution with c tight
constraints (since there are c variables). The first constraint is already tight, so we have c − 1 other tight
constraints. At least c − 3 of those are non-negativity constraints, so we have at most 3 positive variables.
In the remainder of the proof we consider all the cases; details are deferred to Appendix C.
For non-adaptive algorithms we observed that efficiency increases with p but, unfortunately, the largest
value that yields a fair-share algorithm is p = 2. For the guarded poly-proportional family we can get a
fair-share algorithm for all p, but how does the efficiency depend on this value? For larger values of p, the
algorithm is trying to maximize social welfare more aggressively, but this means that it is more likely to
reach a critical point, after which it is forced to be inefficient.
Based on a class of instances provided in Appendix C, Figure 1 provides approximation upper bounds
quantifying precisely this trade-off: if for each p we restrict our attention to instances where the corresponding
poly-proportional algorithm does not reach a critical point, then the performance increases with p. But, as
p increases, the set of instances with a critical point keeps growing and the greediness of the algorithm
gradually hurts its efficiency.
For each value of p the points in the plot upper bound the algorithm’s approximation, so the most
promising choice is p = 2.7, where the two points meet. Our main result is that the guarded poly-proportional
with parameter p = 2.7 achieves a 0.916 approximation to the optimal social welfare which, as the figure
indicates, is essentially optimal within the family of guarded poly-proportional algorithms.
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Figure 1: Approximation to the optimal welfare by guarded poly-proportional algorithms for different values
of p, depending on whether the instance has a critical point or not
Theorem 3. The guarded poly-proportional algorithm with parameter p = 2.7 achieves a 0.916 approximation
to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Let α be the approximation to the optimal welfare of the algorithm. We encode an instance with
variables vt = v1t, and λt =
v2t
v1t
, for all t ∈ [T ]. Let c be the critical point (if any) and without loss
of generality, assume that agent 1 reaches her critical point. Agent 2’s utility
∑
t≤c vtλt · (vtλt)
p
vpt+(vtλt)
p =∑
t≤c vt
λp+1t
1+λpt
. Agent 1’s utility is
∑
t≤c vt
1
1+λpt
+
∑T
t=c+1 vt. Similarly to Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 we write
a mathematical program for the optimal approximation ratio:
minimize
∑c
t=1 vt
1+λp+1t
1+λpt
+
∑T
t=c+1 vt
subject to
∑T
t=1 vt = 2(
∑c
t=1 vt
1
1+λpt
+
∑T
t=c+1 vt)∑T
t=1 vt =
∑T
t=1 vtλt∑
t∈[T ]:λt≤1 vt +
∑
t∈[T ]:λt>1 λtvt = 1
vt ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [T ]
λt ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [T ]
The first constraint encodes the fact that c is a critical point: the LHS is the total value of agent 1, while
the RHS is twice the utility of agent 1. These should be equal since c is a critical point for agent 1. The
second constraint equalizes the agents’ values (instead of normalizing them to 1), while the third constraint
normalizes the optimal welfare to 1. One can go from an arbitrary feasible solution of this program to a valid
instance by dividing each vit by
∑T
t=1 vt, and vice versa, while the approximation to the optimal welfare
(which is equal to the welfare when the optimal welfare is 1) is exactly the objective of this program.
Now observe that for every fixed choice of the λt variables we get a linear program (with respect to the
9
vt variables):
minimize
∑c
t=1 vtat +
∑T
t=c+1 vt
subject to
∑T
t=1 vt = 2(
∑c
t=1 vtbt +
∑T
t=c+1 vt)∑T
t=1 vt =
∑T
t=1 vtλt∑
t∈[T ]:λt≤1 vt +
∑
t∈[T ]:λt>1 λtvt = 1
vt ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [T ]
where at =
1+(λt)
p+1
1+(λt)p
and bt =
1
1+(λt)p
.
By the fundamental theorem of linear programming we must have T tight constraints, and we have T +3
total constraints (with the first three being tight), so any optimal solution should have exactly 3 strictly
positive vt variables.
We take cases depending on the value of c. Specifically, our three strictly positive vt variables are either
all three after the critical point, two and one, one and two, or all three before the critical point. The first
case is, of course, impossible (since the first constraint cannot be satisfied), so we consider each of the other
ones.
For each of the cases considered we write a closed form for the approximation to the welfare, as a
function of the λts, we then minimize. For c = 1 (one item before, two items after the critical point) we
get a worst-case approximation of 0.916. c = 3, corresponding to no critical points, also gives a worst-case
approximation. This corresponds to the intuition from Figure 1. Details can be found in Appendix C.
We complement our positive result by showing that no fair-share adaptive algorithm, even with full
knowledge of the number of items T , can achieve an approximation to the welfare much better than the
guarded poly-proportional family.
Theorem 4. There is no fair-share algorithm that achieves an approximation to the optimal welfare better
than 0.933.
Proof. Assume that there exists an online algorithm A that achieves an approximation better than 0.933, and
consider the following two instances. In the first instance, the agents values are v11 = 0.568 and v21 = 0.427
in the first round and v12 = 1 − v11 = 0.432 and v22 = 1 − v21 = 0.573 in the second round. In the
second instance, the agent values, v′, are again, v′11 = 0.568 and v
′
21 = 0.427 in the first round, but their
values in the second round are v′12 = 1 − v′11 = 0.432 and v′22 = 0.306 and agent 2’s remaining value of
v′23 = 1− v′21− v′22 = 0.267 is realized in the third round. In what follows, we show that no online algorithm
can simultaneously satisfy the fair-share property and guarantee an approximation better than 0.933 in both
of these two instances. This argument takes advantage of the fact that prior to the second round, no online
algorithm can distinguish between these two instances.
Case 1. Assume the algorithm allocates less than 0.6977 of item 1 to agent 1 in the first round, i.e.,
x11 < 0.6977, and consider instance 1. Fair-share for agent 1 implies that
v11x11 + v12x12 ≥ 1/2 ⇒ x12 > 0.241.
The algorithm’s welfare is therefore
v11x11 + v21x21 + v12x12 + v22x22
1 + (v11 − v21)x11 + (v21 − v11)x12 < 1.064,
while the optimal welfare is v11 + v22 = 1.141, so
α =
ALG
OPT
< 0.933.
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Case 2. Now, let x11 ≥ 0.6977 and assume that x′22 < 0.427x11−0.1940.306 is the amount of the item that
algorithm A would allocate to agent 2 in round 2 if the second instance values were realized. In this case,
the fair-share property will be violated for agent 2 because her utility is
u2 = v21(1− x11) + v′22x′22 + 1− v21 − v′22
< 0.427(1− x11) + 0.3060.427x11 − 0.194
0.306
+ 0.267
< 0.5.
Case 3. Finally, if x11 ≥ 0.6977 and x22 ≥ 0.427x11−0.1940.306 and consider the second instance. The agents’
utilities are
u1 = v11x11 + v
′
12(1− x′22)
= 0.432 + 0.568x11 − 0.432x′22 , and
u2 = v
′
21(1− x11) + v′22x′22 + v′23
= 0.694 + 0.306x′22 − 0.427x11.
This leads to a social welfare of
u1 + u2 = 1.126 + 0.141x11 − 0.126x′22
≤ 1.126 + 0.141x11 − 0.1260.427x11 − 0.194
0.306
≤ 1.206− 0.035x11
≤ 1.182,
while the optimal welfare v′11 + v
′
12 + v
′
23 = 1.267, so
α =
ALG
OPT
< 0.933.
6 Instances Involving Multiple Agents
We now briefly turn to instances with n ≥ 3. Caragiannis et al. [2012] prove that even if we knew all the
values in advance, the price of fairness, i.e., the worst-case ratio of the optimal social welfare of a fair-
share outcome over the social welfare of the optimal outcome, is O(1/
√
n). Our next result shows that
the proportional algorithm matches this bound in an online manner, and therefore achieves the optimal
approximation.
Theorem 5. The proportional algorithm guarantees a 1
2
√
n
, i.e., Ω(1/
√
n), approximation to the optimal
social welfare.
Proof. Consider any round t and let vmax = maxi∈N vit be the highest value in this round, and i∗ ∈
arg maxi∈N vit be an agent with this value. Let H be the set of agents with vit ≥ vmax/
√
n and L be the
set of all the remaining agents. If the portion of the item that the proportional algorithm allocates to the
agents in H is at least half of all the item, then the social welfare in this round is at least vmax/(2
√
n).
On the other hand, if the agents in L are allocated more than half of the item, this means that∑
i∈L vit/
∑
i∈N vit > 1/2. But, vmax >
√
nvit for all i ∈ L and thus
vmax >
√
n
|L|
∑
i∈L
vit ⇒ vmax∑
i∈N vit
>
1√
n
·
∑
i∈L vit∑
i∈N vit
,
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which implies that vmax∑
i∈N vit
> 1
2
√
n
, so the allocation to agent i∗ is at least 1/(2
√
n), and thus in this case
as well the social welfare is at least vmax/(2
√
n).
Since the optimal welfare in t is vmax and the proportional algorithm guarantees a welfare of at least
vmax/(2
√
n), summing over all rounds concludes the proof.
The next result shows that even if we were to restrict the benchmark to be the optimal social welfare
subject to the fair-share constraint, still, no online algorithm could achieve an approximation better than
Ω(1/
√
n). Therefore the proportional algorithm is also optimal with respect to the competitive ratio measure,
which quantifies the worst case loss of welfare due to the online aspect of the problem alone.
Theorem 6. No online fair-share algorithm can achieve a 3
√
n
n+
√
n−1 approximation to the optimal offline
fair-share algorithm. That is, the best feasible approximation is O( 1√
n
).
Proof. Consider an instance with n agents and
√
n + n rounds. In the first
√
n rounds, for the first
√
n
agent, we have vii =
n−1
n , and vit = 0, t 6= i. For the remaining n−
√
n agents, we have vjt =
n−1
n·√n , for all
j >
√
n. Then, in the last n rounds, we have vii =
1
n , and vit = 0 elsewhere, for all i ∈ N .
In the offline problem, each agent gets 1n from the last n rounds. Therefore the optimal offline fair-share
welfare is
OPT =
√
n · n− 1
n
+ n · 1
n
=
n− 1√
n
+ 1.
We now focus our attention on round
√
n. Note that each agent has remaining value 1/n at this round.
An online fair-share algorithm needs to plan for the event that the remaining values are all realized in the
next round,
√
n + 1. In order to satisfy fair-share in this scenario, each agent must have utility at least
n−1
n
1
n =
n−1
n2 at the end of round
√
n.
Consider an agent i with i >
√
n. Since her value for all the items before round
√
n is vit =
n−1
n
√
n
, to give
this agent utility at least n−1n2 her total allocation must be
∑√n
t=1 xit ≥ n−1n2 n
√
n
n−1 =
1√
n
. This is true for all
i >
√
n, so there is
√
n− (n−√n) 1√
n
= 1 of the resources, in the first
√
n, to be allocated among the first√
n agents. No matter how this is split, the contribution to the welfare is the same. Let U t be the social
welfare at the end of round t. We have
U
√
n = 1 · n− 1
n
+ (n−√n)n− 1
n2
= 2− 2
√
n+ n+ 1
n
√
n
.
For the last n rounds our algorithm can make an optimal choice: ALG = U
√
n + n · 1n = 3− 2
√
n+n+1
n
√
n
< 3.
Therefore, we have α = ALGOPT <
3
n−1√
n
+1
= 3
√
n
n+
√
n−1 .
6.1 Characterization of fair-share algorithms
Our final result provides an interesting characterization of fair-share algorithms that could enable the design
of novel algorithms in this setting. This characterization uses a very simple condition, which we refer to
as doomsday compatibility, and we show that this myopic condition is necessary, but also sufficient, for
guaranteeing that the final outcome will satisfy fair-share.
Definition 1 (Doomsday Compatibility). We say an allocation xt = {xit}i∈N at day t is doomsday com-
patible if there exists some allocation xt+1 that would make the overall outcome satisfy fair-share, if t + 1
was the last round, i.e., if all the agents’ remaining value was realized in round t+ 1.
Proposition 1. An online algorithm satisfies the fair-share property if and only if its allocation in every
round t is doomsday compatible.
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Proof. First, it is easy to show that doomsday compatibility in every round t is sufficient for an online
algorithm to satisfy fair-share. If this condition is satisfied for all t, then it is also satisfied for t = T − 1 and
t = T , and thus the final outcome is guaranteed to satisfy fair-share.
Now, we show that this condition is also necessary for the algorithm to satisfy fair-share. Assume that
there exists a round t such that the online algorithm’s allocation in this round is not doomsday compatible.
Then, clearly this algorithm would not be fair-share for the instance where t + 1 is indeed the last round,
i.e., where all of the agents’ remaining value is realized in round t+ 1.
Theorem 7. If an algorithm is doomsday compatible in some round t < T , then there always exists an
allocation xt+1 such that it is also doomsday compatible in round t+ 1.
Proof. Consider any round t where the algorithm’s allocation is doomsday compatible. This means that
there exists some allocation x˜ that would achieve fair-share if t + 1 was the last round. In order to show
that we can always maintain doomsday compatibility in round t + 1, it suffices to show that there always
exists some allocation xt+1 for that round and an allocation xt+2 for the next round such that the algorithm
would satisfy fair-share if t+ 2 were the last round. We show that, in fact, using x˜ for both rounds t+ 1 and
t+ 2 would satisfy this condition.
To verify this fact, let v¯it be the remaining value for each agent i after round t, and let ui be the total
utility each agent received up to round t. Since x˜ would make the outcome fair-share if t + 1 was the last
round, for any agent i we have ui + v¯itx˜ ≥ 1n . Now, if on the other hand t + 2 was the last round, let
xt+1 = x˜ and xt+2 = x˜. Then, for any agent i we would have
ui + vi(t+1)x
t+1 + (v¯it − vi(t+1))xt+2
=ui + vi(t+1)x˜ + (v¯it − vi(t+1))x˜
=ui + v¯itx˜ ≥ 1
n
.
Therefore, for xt+1 = x˜, there exists a xt+2 = x˜ such that the algorithm is doomsday compatible in round
t+ 1.
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A Limitations without Normalization
Here, we observe that if values are not normalized, the only fair-share algorithm is equal-split. Consider any
algorithm A that does not always split equally. Let r be the first round in which there exists an agent i that
gets xAir <
1
n . Since r is the first such round, we have x
A
jt =
1
n for all j ∈ N and t < r. Therefore,
r∑
t=1
vitx
A
it <
1
n
r∑
t=1
vit.
But then, if for all subsequent rounds k > r all agents have zero value, i.e., vik = 0 for all i ∈ N (or,
alternatively, if round r was the last round), algorithm A would fail to satisfy fair-share for agent i.
B Proofs missing from Section 4
Missing from Theorem 1
Analysis of α(v1, v2). Recall that
α(v1, v2) =
v21+(1−v2)2
v1+1−v2 +
(1−v1)2+v22
v2+1−v1
v1 + v2
=
2(1 + 2v1v2 − v1 − v2)
(1− (v1 − v2)2)(v1 + v2)
Taking a partial derivative with respect to v1 we have:
∂
∂v1
α(v1, v2) =
2f(v1, v2)
((1− (v1 − v2)2)(v1 + v2))2 ,
where f(v1, v2) = v
3
1(4v2 − 2) + v21(3 − 2v22 − 2v2) + 2v1(v22 − v2) − 2v42 + 2v32 + v22 − 1. Furthermore,
∂
∂v2
α(v1, v2) =
2f(v2,v1)
((1−(v1−v2)2)(v1+v2))2 . Therefore, finding all the critical points is equivalent to finding all
v1, v2 such that f(v1, v2) = f(v2, v1) = 0. Let v1 = x and v2 = y, we have
������ ffun[x_, y_] = -1 + y^2 + 2 y^3 - 2 y^4 + 2 x (-y + y^2) + (x^2) (3 - 2 y - 2 y^2) +(x^3) (-2 + 4 y)
������ -1 + y2 + 2 y3 - 2 y4 + x3 (-2 + 4 y) + x2 3 - 2 y - 2 y2 + 2 x -y + y2
������ Solve[ ffun[x, y] ⩵ 0 && ffun[y, x] ⩵ 0, {x, y}, Reals]
������ x → - 1
2
, y → 1
2
, {x → 0, y → 1}, x → 1
2
, y → - 1
2
, {x → 1, y → 0},
x → - 1
2
, y → - 1
2
, x → - 1
2
, y → 1
2
, x → 1
2
, y → - 1
2
, x → 1
2
, y → 1
2

If v1 or v2 is negative, the corresponding solution is outside of our domain. Furthermore, both v1 and
v2 have to be strictly positive (since this is a two item instance), thus we only need to consider one solution
v1 = v2 = 1/
√
2.
Going back to α, the worst approximation to optimal welfare is achieved for v1 = v2 = 1/
√
2, and has
value
α
(
1√
2
,
1√
2
)
= 2(
√
2− 1) ≈ 0.828
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Missing from the proof of Claim 3
Given an encoding of an instance as vt = v1t and λt =
v1t
v2t
, ALG, the social welfare of the quadratic-
proportional algorithm can be written as
ALG =
∑
t∈[T ]
v3t + (vtλt)
3
v2t + (vtλt)
2
=
∑
t∈[T ]
vt
1 + λ3t
1 + λ2t
.
Now, consider the following mathematical program:
minimize
∑
t∈[T ]
vt
1 + λ3t
1 + λ2t
subject to
∑
t∈[T ]
vt =
∑
t∈[T ]
vtλt
∑
t∈[T ]:λt≤1
vt +
∑
t∈[T ]:λt>1
λtvt = 1
vt ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [T ]
λt ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [T ]
The objective is to minimize the approximation to the optimal welfare of the algorithm. Solving this
program would give us the worst case approximation to optimal welfare: consider an arbitrary feasible
solution v, λ to this program. By dividing each agents’ values (each vit) by their common total value∑
t∈[T ] vit we get a feasible instance for the original problem. Furthermore, the approximation to optimal
welfare in this instance is equal to the value of the objective: the social welfare of the quadratic-proportional
algorithm and the optimal social welfare are the program’s objective and 1, divided by the normalization
term
∑
t∈[T ] vit, respectively. Showing that an arbitrary online instance gives a feasible solution to this
program with the same approximation is equally straightforward.
Second, notice that for any fixed λ, the remaining program, with variables only the vts, is a linear
program with T + 2 constraints and T variables. By the fundamental theorem of linear program, any
minimizer occurs at the region’s corner, i.e. any minimizer would have T constraints tight. Since the total
number of constraints is T + 2, at least T − 2 of the T tight constraints are non-negativity constraints. One
can easily observe that the case of exactly T − 1 tight non-negativity constraints gives an approximation to
optimal welfare of 1 (since there is only one item with v1t > 0), so the worst case approximation to optimal
welfare happens when there are exactly two positive variables/items with positive value for agent 1; without
loss of generality (poly-proportional allocation algorithms are memoryless) these are the first two items.
Third, for every instance where agent 1 values only the first two items, the approximation to optimal
welfare is minimized when agent 2 also values only the first two items.
Missing from the proof of Lemma 3
Taking the partial derivative of α(v1, v2) with respect to v1 and v2 (and notice that the function is symmetric
with respect to v1 and v2) we get that:
∂α(v1, v2)
∂v1
=
f(v1, v2)
(v21 + (1− v2)2)2(v22 + (1− v1)2)2(v1 + v2)2
∂α(v1, v2)
∂v2
=
f(v2, v1)
(v22 + (1− v1)2)2(v21 + (1− v2)2)2(v1 + v2)2
16
where
f(v1, v2) = −v81 + v71(6− 4v2) + v61(30v2 − 18v22 − 19)
+ v51(−16v32 + 70v22 − 82v2 + 36) + v41(70v32 − 16v42
− 131v22 + 116v2 − 41) + v31(−4v52 + 42v42 − 116v32
+ 152v22 − 104v2 + 30) + v21(2v62 + 2v52 − 37v42 + 96v32
− 116v22 + 70v2 − 17) + v1(8v72 − 22v62 + 14v52 + 20v42
− 52v32 + 58v22 − 34v2 + 8) + v82 − 6v72 + 11v62 − 4v52
− 11v42 + 18v32 − 15v22 + 8v2 − 2.
Let v1 = x and v2 = y. We write f(v1, v2) in Mathematica.
������ f[x_, y_] = -x^8 + x^7 (6 - 4 y) + x^6 (30 y - 18 y^2 - 19) + x^5 (-16 y^3 + 70 y^2 - 82 y + 36) +
x^4 (70 y^3 - 16 y^4 - 131 y^2 + 116 y - 41) +
x^3 (-4 y^5 + 42 y^4 - 116 y^3 + 152 y^2 - 104 y + 30) +
x^2 (2 y^6 + 2 y^5 - 37 y^4 + 96 y^3 - 116 y^2 + 70 y - 17) +
x (8 y^7 - 22 y^6 + 14 y^5 + 20 y^4 - 52 y^3 + 58 y^2 - 34 y + 8) + y^8 - 6 y^7 + 11 y^6 -
4 y^5 - 11 y^4 + 18 y^3 - 15 y^2 + 8 y - 2
������ -2 - x8 + x7 (6 - 4 y) + 8 y - 15 y2 + 18 y3 - 11 y4 - 4 y5 + 11 y6 - 6 y7 + y8 +
x6 -19 + 30 y - 18 y2 + x5 36 - 82 y + 70 y2 - 16 y3 + x4 -41 + 116 y - 131 y2 + 70 y3 - 16 y4 +
x3 30 - 104 y + 152 y2 - 116 y3 + 42 y4 - 4 y5 + x2 -17 + 70 y - 116 y2 + 96 y3 - 37 y4 + 2 y5 + 2 y6 +
x 8 - 34 y + 58 y2 - 52 y3 + 20 y4 + 14 y5 - 22 y6 + 8 y7
Solving ∂α(v1,v2)∂v1 =
∂α(v1,v2)
∂v2
= 0 is equivalent to solving f(v1, v2) = f(v2, v1) = 0.
������ Solve[f[x, y] ⩵ 0 && f[y, x] ⩵ 0, {x, y}, Reals]
������ {x → 0, y → 1}, {x → 1, y → 0}, {x → 1, y → 1}, x → 0.627… , y → 0.627… ,x → 0.355… , y → 0.985… , x → 0.985… , y → 0.355… 
We numerically confirm that the following are the only solutions: (0, 1), (0.626538, 0.626538), (0.35526, 0.985127)
and (1, 1). Notice that ∂α(v1,v2)∂v1 (0, 1) and
∂α(v1,v2)
∂v2
(0, 1) are not defined.
Plugging back in the definition of α we have
α(0, 1) =
1+1
1+1
1
= 1,
α(0.6265, 0.6265) =
2 0.3735
3+0.62653
0.37352+0.62652
1.253
= 0.8941,
α(0.355, 0.985) =
0.6453+0.9853
0.6452+0.9852 +
0.0153+0.3553
0.0152+0.3552
0.355 + 0.985
= 0.9234,
α(1, 1) =
1
1 +
1
1
1 + 1
= 1.
We conclude that the algorithm achieves 0.89 of optimal welfare in the worst case.
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C Proofs missing from Section 5
Critical points within rounds
In this subsection we generalize the notion of a critical point, we discuss how guarded poly-proportional
algorithms handle critical points, and why we can, without loss of generality, assume that these points arise
only at the beginning (or end) of a round.
Let v be an instance with T items such that the guarded poly-proportional algorithm with parameter p
reaches a critical point for, say, agent 1 (without loss of generality) within some round c. This would mean
that at the beginning of this round a critical point has not yet been reached, yet at the end of this round it
is already too late. Formally,
c−1∑
t=1
v1tx1t +
T∑
t=c
v1t >
1
2
>
c∑
t=1
v1tx1t +
T∑
t=c+1
v1t,
where x1t is the fraction of item t allocated using the poly-proportional algorithm with parameter p. In
this case, we simulate the algorithm as a continuous process, so the critical point is reached after a fraction f
of the item of round c has been allocated. Specifically, this is the point when the utility of the agent up to that
point, i.e.,
∑c−1
t=1 v1tx1t + f
(v1c)
p+1
(v1c)p+(v2c)p
, added to the agent’s remaining value, i.e., (1− f)v1c +
∑T
t=c+1 v1t,
adds up to exactly 1/2. When this point is reached, the algorithm allocates all of the remaining 1−f fraction
of the item, as well as all subsequent items, to agent 1.
Now, to verify that we can assume this point is always reached at the end of a round, we construct an
alternative instance with T + 1 (instead of T ) rounds, such that the critical point is reached at the end of
round c and the outcome of the algorithm is exactly the same. In fact, all that we need to do is just replace
the item of round c with two items of value (fv1c, fv2c) for the first one and ((1− f)v1c, (1− f)v2c) for the
second; all other values remain the same as the original instance. The modified instance remains valid, since
the agents’ values still add up to one and it is easy to observe that the outcome of the algorithm would be
the same, while the critical point is reached at the end of round c.
Missing from the proof of Lemma 4
Proof of Lemma 4 continued. Here, we do the case analysis.
Case 1. There is exactly one positive variable, say v1, and the second and third constraints are not tight.
That is, we have v1 < 1 and v1λ1 < 1. Since v1 < 1, then the first constraint implies that
λp1
1+λp1
> 12 , which
gives λ1 > 1. Thus
1
2
=(First Const.) v1
λp1
1 + λp1
< v1
λp+11
1 + λp1
= Objective.
Case 2.1. There are exactly two positive variables, v1 and v2, and the second constraint is tight (i.e.
v1 + v2 = 1), while the third constraint is not tight (i.e. v1λ1 + v2λ2 < 1).
First, we observe that tightness of the second constraint implies that it can’t be that both λ1 and λ2 are
strictly bigger than 1, otherwise we would have v1λ1 + v2λ2 > 1. Furthermore, by the first constraint we
cannot have both λ1 and λ2 strictly less than 1. Thus, assume without loss of generality that λ1 > 1 and
λ2 < 1. v1 + v2 = 1 and v1
λp1
1+λp1
+ v2
λp2
1+λp2
= 1/2 imply that
v1 =
(
1
2
− λ
p
2
1 + λp2
)
/
(
λp1
1 + λp1
− λ
p
2
1 + λp2
)
.
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Re-writing the objective we have that the utility of agent 2 is
u2 = v1
λp+11
1 + λp1
+ v2
λp+12
1 + λp2
=
λp+12
1 + λp2
+ v1
(
λp+11
1 + λp1
− λ
p+1
2
1 + λp2
)
=
λp+12
1 + λp2
+
1
2 −
λp2
1+λp2
λp1
1+λp1
− λp2
1+λp2
(
λp+11
1 + λp1
− λ
p+1
2
1 + λp2
)
=
λp+11 − λp+12 + (λ1λ2)p(λ2 − λ1)
2(λp1 − λp2)
Taking the partial derivative with respect to both λ1 we have:
∂u2
∂λ1
=
f(λ1, λ2)(λ
p
1 − (λ1λ2)p)
2λ1(λ
p
1 − λp2)2
,
where f(λ1, λ2) = λ
p+1
1 − (p+ 1)λ1λp2 + pλp+12 . Notice that ∂f∂λ1 = (p+ 1)λ
p
1 − (p+ 1)λp2 > 0, for all λ1 > λ2.
Therefore f(λ1, λ2) > f(λ2, λ2) = 0. Consequently, we have
∂u2
∂λ1
> 0 for all λ1 > 1. In other words, the
utility of agent 2 is lower bounded by u2(1, λ2), or
u2(1, λ2) =
1− λp+12 + λp2(λ2 − 1)
2(1− λp2)
=
1
2
.
Case 2.2. There are exactly two positive variables, v1 and v2, and the third constraint is tight (i.e.
v1λ1 + v2λ2 = 1), while the second constraint is not tight (i.e. v1 + v2 < 1).
It’s easy to see that we can’t have λ1, λ2 < 1. If λ1, λ2 > 1 we have
v1
λp+11
1 + λp1
+ v2
λp+12
1 + λp2
> v1
λp1
1 + λp1
+ v2
λp2
1 + λp2
=
1
2
,
which is a contradiction (because the first constraint is tight). Therefore, λ1 < 1 and λ2 > 1 without loss of
generality.
We have
1
2
=(First constr.) v1
λp1
1 + λp1
+ v2
λp2
1 + λp2
=(Third constr.) v1
λp1
1 + λp1
+
1− v1λ1
λ2
λp2
1 + λp2
,
which implies that
v1 =
(
λp2 + 1− 2λp−12
)
(λp1 + 1)
2
(
λp1 (λ
p
2 + 1)− λ1λp−12 (λp1 + 1)
) .
Plugging into the third constraint and re-arranging we get
v2 =
2λp1λ
p
2 + 2λ
p
1 − λp+11 λp2 − λp+11 − λ1λp2 − λ1
2λ2
(
λp1 (λ
p
2 + 1)− λ1λp−12 (λp1 + 1)
) .
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Re-writing the objective we have
u2 = v1
λp+11
1 + λp1
+ v2
λp+12
1 + λp2
=
λp+11 λ
p
2 + λ
p+1
1 − 2λp+11 λp−12
2
(
λp1 (λ
p
2 + 1)− λ1λp−12 (λp1 + 1)
)
+
2λp1λ
p
2 + 2λ
p
1 − λp+11 λp2 − λp+11 − λ1λp2 − λ1
2
(
λp1 (λ
p
2 + 1)− λ1λp−12 (λp1 + 1)
) λp2
1 + λp2
=
λp+11 λ
p
2 + λ
p+1
1 − 2λp+11 λp−12 − 2λp+11 λ2p−12
2
(
λp1 (λ
p
2 + 1)− λ1λp−12 (λp1 + 1)
) 1
1 + λp2
+
2λp1λ
2p
2 + 2λ
p
1λ
p
2 − λ1λ2p2 − λ1λp2
2
(
λp1 (λ
p
2 + 1)− λ1λp−12 (λp1 + 1)
) 1
1 + λp2
=
λp+11 (1− 2λp−12 ) + (2λp1 − λ1)λp2
2
(
λp1 (λ
p
2 + 1)− λ1λp−12 (λp1 + 1)
)
Taking the partial derivative with respect to λ2 we have
∂u2
∂λ2
=
λp2g(λ1, p)f(λ2, λ1)
2(−λ1λp−12 (λp1 + 1) + λp1(λp2 + 1))2
where
g(λ1, p) = λ1 − 2λp1 + λp+11 , and
f(λ2, λ1) = (p− 1)λp+11 + λ1λp2 − pλp1λ2.
Notice that ∂f∂λ2 = pλ1−pλ
p
1, which is positive since λ1 < 1. Thus, f(λ2, λ1) ≥ f(0, λ1) = λp+11 (p−1) > 0.
For g(λ1, p), we take the partial derivative with respect to p:
∂g
∂p
= λp−11 lnλ1(λ1 − 2),
which is non-negative for all λ1 ≤ 1. Therefore g(λ1, p) ≥ g(λ1, 0) = 2λ1 − 2 > 0.
Since both g(λ1, p) and f(λ2, λ1) are strictly positive, we have
∂u2
∂λ2
> 0. Therefore, the utility of agent 2
is at least u2(λ1, 0). Plugging λ2 = 0 in the definition of u2 we have
−λp+11 + 2λp1 − λ1
2 (2λp1 − λ1 (λp1 + 1))
=
−λp1 + 2λp−11 − 1
2
(
2λp−11 − λp1 − 1
) = 1
2
.
Case 3. There are exactly three positive variables, v1, v2 and v3, and both the second and third constraints
are tight (i.e. v1 + v2 + v3 = 1 and v1λ1 + v2λ2 + v3λ3 = 1). Since both agents have seen a value of 1, and
the first agent to reach a critical point was agent 1, then by definition the utility of agent 2 is at least 1/2.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.
Instances of Figure 1
In the table below we present some of the instances that we used in the plot of Figure 1. For all the
instances where a critical point (CP) is not reached, we have two rounds, with v11 = v22 and v12 = 1−v11 =
20
v21,therefore knowing v11 is sufficient for constructing the whole instance. On the other hand, for the
instances where a critical point is reached, we have a three rounds instance where v12 = 1−v11, v23 = 1−v21,
and v22 = v13 = . where  is an arbitrarily small positive number. In this case, it is sufficient to know v11
and v21 to construct the whole instance.
In the table below, for each value of p from the plot of Figure 1 we provide the instance that gives the
lower of the two approximation upper bounds. For the case of p = 2.7 we include both instances. And with
rounding the two instances (approximately) coincide.
p value with CP Instance Approx
2 No v11 = v22 = 0.626 0.894
2.1 No v11 = v22 = 0.621 0.898
2.2 No v11 = v22 = 0.617 0.902
2.3 No v11 = v22 = 0.613 0.905
2.4 No v11 = v22 = 0.609 0.908
2.5 No v11 = v22 = 0.606 0.911
2.6 No v11 = v22 = 0.602 0.914
2.7 No v11 = v22 = 0.599 0.916
2.7 Yes v11 = 0.76, v22 = 0.97 0.916
2.8 Yes v11 = 0.75, v21 = 0.96 0.912
2.9 Yes v11 = 0.74, v21 = 0.95 0.908
3.0 Yes v11 = 0.73, v21 = 0.94 0.904
Missing from the proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3 continued. We continue the case analysis here.
Case 1. One item before, and two items after the critical point. Without loss of generality the first item
is 1 and the other two are 2 and 3. For convenience, normalize all values to add up to 1.
Since c is a critical point, the utility of agent 1 for agent 2’s allocation is 1/2, or
v1
λp1
1 + λp1
=
1
2
=⇒ v1 = 1 + λ
p
1
2λp1
.
The above equation further implies that, since v1 ≤ 1, then λ1 ≥ 1. This implies that in the optimal solution
the first item goes to agent 2, so the maximum possible welfare is 2−v1 (and this is tight, by setting λ1 = 1v1
and v2 = 1− v1).
Since agent 1 gets utility 1/2, the objective is
1
2
+ v1
λp+11
1 + λp1
=
1
2
+
1 + λp1
2λp1
λp+11
1 + λp1
=
1 + λ1
2
.
Therefore we have:
α =
ALG
OPT
=
1 + λ1
2(2− v1) =
1 + λ1
4− 1+λp1
λp1
=
λp1 + λ
p+1
1
3λp1 − 1
.
Taking the derivative we have
∂α
∂λ1
=
λp−11 (3λ
p+1
1 − (1 + p)λ1 − p)
(3λp1 − 1)2
.
Solving dαdλ1 = 0 for p = 2.7 we get that λ1 = 1.27764; plugging it back in we have
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������ Solve[{(x^1.7 (3 x^3.7 - 3.7 x - 2.7))/((3 x^2.7 - 1)^2) ⩵ 0, x > 1}, x, Reals]
������ {{x → 1.27764}}
α(1.27764) > 0.916.
Case 2. Two items before, and one item after the critical point. Without loss of generality the items are
v1, v2, v3 > 0 and c = 2. First notice that if cannot be that both v3 > 0 and λ3 > 0: otherwise we can
construct a worse instance by splitting the third item into two rounds, where each agent wants a different
item, thereby making the optimal welfare larger, but keeping the algorithm’s welfare the same. Furthermore,
the case that agent 2 has positive value for the item, but agent 1 has zero value for the item is impossible
(since v3 > 0 by the original argument). Therefore, λ3 = 0.
Since agent 2 has seen all her value we get
v1λ1 + v2λ2 = 1 =⇒ v2 = 1− v1λ1
λ2
.
Since agent 1 has value 1/2 for agent 2’s allocation we have
v1
λp1
1 + λp1
+
1− v1λ1
λ2
λp2
1 + λp2
=
1
2
which implies
v1 =
(1 + λp2 − 2λp−12 )(1 + λp1)
2
(
λp1(1 + λ
p
2)− λ1λp−12 (1 + λp1)
) , and
v2 =
1
λ2
− λ1(1 + λ
p
2 − 2λp−12 )(1 + λp1)
2λ2
(
λp1(1 + λ
p
2)− λ1λp−12 (1 + λp1)
) .
The algorithm’s welfare is
ALG =
1
2
+ v1
λp+11
1 + λp1
+ v2
λp+12
1 + λp2
.
We can break cases based on the value of λ1 and λ2. They cannot both be strictly smaller than 1 (otherwise
we can’t have both v1λ1 + v2λ2 = 1 and v1 + v2 + v3 = 1). The case that both equal to 1 is trivial (identical
agents), and the λ1 > 1, λ2 < 1 and λ1 < 1, λ2 > 1 cases are symmetric, so we only need to consider one of
them. First, without loss of generality assume that λ1 > 1, λ2 < 1. For convenience we normalize all values
to add up to 1. The optimal welfare is OPT = 2− v1 − v2λ2. We can therefore write
α(λ1, λ2) =
ALG
OPT
=
1
2 + v1
λp+11
1+λp1
+ v2
λp+12
1+λp2
2− v1 − v2λ2 ,
Let λ1 = x, λ2 = y, and plug in the closed forms for v1 and v2.
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������ v1[x_, y_] = (1/2 - y^1.7/(1 + y^2.7))/(x^2.7/(1 + x^2.7) - (x y^1.7)/(1 + y^2.7))
������ 12 - y1.71+y2.7
x2.7
1+x2.7 - x y1.71+y2.7
������ v2[x_, y_] = ((-x + 2 x^2.7 - x^3.7) (1 + y^2.7))/(-2 x y^2.7 - 2 x^3.7 y^2.7 + 2 x^2.7 (y + y^3.7))
������ -x + 2 x2.7 - x3.7 1 + y2.7-2 x y2.7 - 2 x3.7 y2.7 + 2 x2.7 y + y3.7
������ g1[x, y] = (0.5 + v1[x, y] (x^3.7)/(1 + x^2.7) + v2[x, y] (y^3.7)/(1 + y^2.7))/(2 - v1[x, y] - y*v2[x, y])
������
0.5 + x3.7 12- y1.71+y2.71+x2.7 x2.7
1+x2.7 - xy1.71+y2.7
+ -x+2 x2.7-x3.7 y3.7-2 x y2.7-2 x3.7 y2.7+2 x2.7 y+y3.7
2 - 12- y1.71+y2.7
x2.7
1+x2.7 - xy1.71+y2.7
- -x+2 x2.7-x3.7 y 1+y2.7-2 x y2.7-2 x3.7 y2.7+2 x2.7 y+y3.7
Minimizing α in the feasible region we have
������ Minimize[{g1[x, y], x > 1 && 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 && v1[x, y] + v2[x, y] < 1}, {x, y}]
������ {0.931747, {x → 1.3362, y → 0.711757}}
α(1.3362, 0.711757) > 0.93.
Now consider the case where λ1, λ2 > 1. The optimal welfare is now OPT = 2− v1 − v2, therefore
α(λ1, λ2) =
ALG
OPT
=
1
2 + v1
λp+11
1+λp1
+ v2
λp+12
1+λp2
2− v1 − v2 .
Using Mathematica we have
������ g2[x, y] = (0.5 + v1[x, y] (x^3.7)/(1 + x^2.7) + v2[x, y] (y^3.7)/(1 + y^2.7))/(2 - v1[x, y] - v2[x, y])
������
0.5 + x3.7 12- y1.71+y2.71+x2.7 x2.7
1+x2.7 - xy1.71+y2.7
+ -x+2 x2.7-x3.7 y3.7-2 x y2.7-2 x3.7 y2.7+2 x2.7 y+y3.7
2 - 12- y1.71+y2.7
x2.7
1+x2.7 - xy1.71+y2.7
- -x+2 x2.7-x3.7 1+y2.7-2 x y2.7-2 x3.7 y2.7+2 x2.7 y+y3.7
������ Minimize[{g2[x, y], x > 1 && y > 1 && v1[x, y] + v2[x, y] < 1 && 0 < v1[x, y] && 0 < v2[x, y]},{x, y}]
������ {0.937215, {x → 1.49709, y → 6.55238}}
α(1.49709, 6.55238) > 0.93
23
Case 3. Three items before c, i.e. c = 3, and all items after the critical point have zero value for both
agents. Then, by definition, there is no critical point. From the analysis of the (un-guarded) poly-proportional
algorithm (Claim 3), we already know that the worst approximation is achieved by a two item instance.
Consider the instance (in standard notation)
Agent one Agent two
1− v1 v2
v1 1− v2
Without loss of generality assume that v2 > 1−v1 and v1 > 1−v2. The optimal welfare is OPT = v1+v2.
Now consider the the performance of algorithm:
ALG =
(1− v1)p+1 + vp+12
(1− v1)p + vp2
+
(1− v2)p+1 + vp+11
(1− v2)p + vp1
.
The approximation to optimal welfare is
α =
ALG
OPT
=
(1−v1)p+1+vp+12
(1−v1)p+vp2 +
(1−v2)p+1+vp+11
(1−v2)p+vp1
v1 + v2
.
Let v1 = x and v2 = y. Using Mathematica in order to minimize α in the feasible region we have
������ a[x_, y_] =((x^3.7 + (1 - y)^3.7)/(x^2.7 + (1 - y)^2.7) + ((1 - x)^3.7 + y^3.7)/((1 - x)^2.7 + y^2.7))/(x + y)
������ x
3.7+(1-y)3.7
x2.7+(1-y)2.7 + (1-x)3.7+y3.7(1-x)2.7+y2.7
x + y
������ Minimize[{a[x, y], 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 && 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}, {x, y}]
������ {0.916422, {x → 0.599254, y → 0.599254}}
α(0.599, 0.599) =
0.4013.7+0.5993.7
(0.401)2.7+0.5992.7 +
0.4013.7+0.5993.7
0.4012.7+0.5992.7
1.198
= 0.9164 > 91.6.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
24
